Memorandum by State Secretary - four reasons for fear that war might rise
Memorandum by the State Secretary - gave four reasons for his fear that war might rise
Source: Documents on German Foreign Policy , series D, vol. VI, p.1064. St. S. No. 609
BERLIN, August 4, 1939
The British Ambassador called on me today about current routine matters. When he began to talk of the general situation, I told him that the Diplomatic Corps were always given to exaggeration. Four weeks ago they had constantly talked of war, now they had gone over to the other extreme. As long as the Poles had not become reasonable, it was really not possible to talk of the situation becoming easier. To this Henderson said he felt himself free from such vacillations; he could still see four causes from which war might arise. 1) The belief that Britain was intending to wage a preventive war might induce Germany to forestall such intentions; 2) It might be thought in Germany that Britain was so much engaged all over the world, that she would be immobilised in Europe; 3) Incidents which might act like sparks in a powder magazine, and 4) The situation generally becoming so acute over questions of prestige, that no one would any longer be able to control it.
I did not discuss these cases precisely, but answered briefly and casually: On 1), Germany was not seeking any quarrels. On 2), Britain certainly had difficulties all over the world and that this war was her own fault. (To this Henderson remarked that at present Germany was rendering great services to Japan. For the object of Britain's Far Easters policy was precisely to keep her hands completely free for action in Europe.) On 4), I could hardly believe that any responsible Government wanted war and would passively allow things to drift into a conflict. Referring to his own fears set out under 4), Henderson then quite briefly touched upon the following idea: he wondered whether some kind of political standstill could not come about so that Europe should not drift into war against the general will. Henderson substantiated this idea by saying that a political truce could perhaps be brought about, extending till about next spring or summer, between Germany and Poland. I replied to Henderson that Britain, through her self-effacement in giving the guarantee to the Poles, had brought about the opposite effect. I quoted, as an example, that, according to a report which had reached me, the Polish representative in Danzig had, only a few days ago, again expressed himself to the League of Nations Commissioner, Professor Burckhardt, in immoderately bellicose terms. I asked Henderson whether he really believed that M. Chodacki would permit himself such fiery language if his head had not been turned by the British guarantee. The Ambassador did not revert today to the subject he had previously discussed, namely a German-British press truce. Neither did he speak of the other rumours circulating in the Diplomatic Corps of a rapid German-Russian rapprochement .
